Hyperagent Composio Security Incident - Hyperagent Response
Last updated: May 24, 2026 at 12:00 PT. We will continue to update this page as we learn more, so please check back regularly.
On May 21, 2026, Composio, a platform we use to facilitate integrations between Hyperagent and various third-party data sources, disclosed a security incident in which a threat actor gained unauthorized access to certain of its internal systems. For full details on the incident itself, see Composio's security bulletin: https://composio.dev/blog/composio-may-2026-security-incident.
This incident did not impact Hyperagent's own systems or software code. This page outlines the steps we've taken to protect our customers and the actions we recommend to ensure your accounts are fully secured.
Timeline
May 21 - Composio publicly disclosed the security incident. Late that night, Composio indicated that the breach affected a small number of Hyperagent customers' GitHub OAuth tokens. We immediately initiated our incident response protocols and commenced an internal investigation.
May 22 - We notified all affected customers whose GitHub tokens were exposed and provided guidance on reviewing their GitHub accounts for suspicious activity.
May 23 - Our own investigation identified additional anomalous activity relating to our Composio account. Composio’s ongoing investigation indicated that the scope of the incident may extend beyond the initially identified GitHub tokens to other tokens stored in Composio, with a potential exposure window beginning as early as 06:00 UTC on May 21, 2026. Composio has not confirmed that these additional tokens were accessed or exploited, but could not rule it out. In an abundance of caution, we immediately disabled all Composio-powered integrations in Hyperagent.
May 24 - We deployed an update to the Hyperagent integrations page (hyperagent.com/settings/integrations) that now shows all previously connected Composio integrations, their authentication type, and their current status.
What we've done
We do not have confirmation that tokens were improperly accessed or misused, but your security comes first. Out of an abundance of caution, we have taken the following steps:
- Disabled all Composio-powered integrations in Hyperagent. No data is flowing through Composio from Hyperagent as of May 23, 2026.
- Verified OAuth token revocations. Where possible, Composio has revoked OAuth authorizations with third-party providers. The Hyperagent team has independently verified that those tokens are revoked.
- Notified all affected customers via email with a summary of the incident and recommended actions.
- Commenced investigation of our own logs and systems to identify any anomalous activity during the exposure window.
What we recommend you do
We recommend treating all third-party tokens that were connected through Composio-powered integrations in Hyperagent as potentially exposed, even though we do not have confirmation that tokens were improperly accessed or misused.
The integrations page at hyperagent.com/settings/integrations shows all previously connected Composio integrations along with their authentication type. For each one, we recommend signing in to the provider, verifying that Composio is no longer authorized, and reviewing recent account activity for anything unexpected. Disconnecting an account on that page removes the credential from Hyperagent - it does not revoke access on the provider's side.
OAuth-connected services (via Composio)
For services you connected to Hyperagent through a Composio-powered OAuth flow (such as Google, GitHub, Microsoft, and similar apps), we recommend confirming that no active Composio connections remain on your accounts.
As an example, for Google (Gmail, Drive, Calendar): visit myaccount.google.com/permissions. Look for any connection referencing Composio and remove it.
For other OAuth services: look for "Connected Apps," "OAuth Apps," "Authorized Apps," or "Third-party access" in your account's security or privacy settings. Remove any connection associated with Composio.
API-key-based integrations (via Composio)
If you connected any services to Hyperagent using an API key you provided directly to Composio (such as Telegram, Granola MCP, Vercel, or any other service for which you manually entered a key), these credentials could not be invalidated by Composio or Hyperagent. You will need to:
- go to that service's API or developer dashboard;
- revoke the API key you provided to Composio in Hyperagent; and
- generate a new key for future use.
As an example, for Vercel: visit https://vercel.com/account/settings/tokens, locate the API token used with Composio on Hyperagent, click the three dots on that token record, and select Delete.
Review your access logs
For all connected services, we recommend reviewing your access and audit logs for any unusual activity since May 21. If your service provides downloadable audit logs, we recommend pulling them for this exposure window so you have a record. Composio has published indicators of compromise (IOCs), including IP addresses associated with threat actor activity that you can cross-reference against your logs.
What's next
Many services can already be connected natively in Hyperagent through Skills, which call a service's API directly - no third-party intermediary involved. You can create a new Skill by visiting hyperagent.com/skills and clicking "Create Skill," or by asking the agent to create a Skill in any existing thread - it will guide you through an interactive setup. Any credentials your Skills require are stored securely and natively within Hyperagent.
We are also building native integrations for widely used tools like GSuite and GitHub, and our team is working hard to make those available as soon as possible.
We will continue to update this page as our investigation progresses. If you need assistance or have questions, please contact us at support@hyperagent.com.
–The Hyperagent Security Team
